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An Abolitionist View of Restorative Justice 
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Abstract: Penal abolitionism is known for its unconventional analysis of crime, the 
law and punishment. Some critical views of restorative justice emerge when the 
alternatives to imprisonment advocated by abolitionists are examined. This paper 
discusses such views, highlighting their critique of professionalism and their 
emphasis on community conflict regulation.  
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Penal abolitionism is not merely a decarceration programme, but also an approach, a 
perspective, a methodology, and most of all a way of seeing. There is clearly an 
abolitionist element in the proposition that the state centralised administration of 
penal justice should be replaced by decentralised forms of autonomous conflict 
regulation. But in a general, concise, formulation it can be suggested that abolitionists 
advocate new ways of dealing with undesirable behaviour, and in doing so they 
situate themselves in an original position within the debate around restorative justice. 
If this is perhaps the major practical outcome, in terms of policy, with which 
abolitionist analysis can be associated, the specific components of their view on 
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restorative justice need to be spelled out. This is the task of the present paper  
(Bianchi, 1984, 1986, 1994; Christie, 1977, 1982, 1986a, 1986b, 1986c, 1993, 1996, 
2004; Hulsman, 1982, 1986, 1991; Mathiesen, 1974, 1990, 2008; Ruggiero, 2010). 
 
Restitutive Sanctions 
 
Durkheim (1960: 111) associates restitutive sanctions to specific forms of social 
solidarity. What distinguishes such sanctions is that they are not expiatory, but 
consist, as he puts it, of means for reinstating the past. The social relationships 
regulated by the practice of restitution are quite different from those addressed by the 
repressive practices of the law. The former ‘unite the thing to the person’, while the 
latter ‘link persons among themselves’. Durkheim notes, in other words, that 
reconciliation may re-establish the relationships of individuals with their property 
rather than those with society at large. The image of society underpinning 
reconciliation and restitution is one of ‘an immense constellation where each star 
moves in its orbit without concern for the movements of neighbouring stars’. In such 
constellation solidarity does not make its components act together and contributes 
very little to ‘the unity of the social body’ (ibid: 116-117). Restitutive sanctions, 
therefore, do not ‘attach different parts of society to one another’; on the contrary, 
they clearly mark the barriers separating the different parts, doing nothing to create 
positive social links: ‘this is not a true solidarity’ (ibid: 119). Durkheim expresses 
views that echo some of the contemporary controversial concepts found in the debate 
around restorative justice.  
   Restorative justice may be essentially defined as a process bringing the actors and 
communities affected by a problematic situation back into the condition in which the 
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problem arose. This model of justice implies that the parties involved decide how to 
deal with a conflict and how to neutralise its collective impact (Marshall, 1996). 
Restorative justice presents itself as an international network or movement, giving the 
impression that its tenets are diametrically opposed to those inspiring conventional 
retributive justice (Casey, 1999; Pollard, 2000; McLaughlin et al, 2003). Against such 
claim abolitionists are not alone in maintaining a critical stance (Williams, 2005).  
    
Participatory Disputes 
 
According to Hulsman (1991: 32), if we want to make progress in the efforts to create 
alternatives to custody, we have to abandon the cultural and social organisation of 
criminal justice. ‘Criminal justice is perpetrator-oriented, based on blame-allocation 
and on a last-judgement view on the world’. It therefore does not provide us with the 
necessary information relating to disputes, nor does it transform contexts in a way that  
emancipatory manners of dealing with disputes can be identified. First, an abolitionist 
approach is oriented towards those directly involved, namely persons or groups who 
directly experience unpleasant events, an approach leading to the discovery of the 
resources which could be mobilised to deal with such events and situations. Second, 
abolitionism must radically critique the idea that the extremely diverse situations 
currently criminalised possess something in common. The label ‘crime’ is  attached to 
all kinds of different problems, which should be tackled by a variety of preventive 
measures. ‘To use punishment on all of them is comparable to treating all kinds of 
illness with leeches’ (Wright, 2008: 242). Each problem or event is characterised by 
its own contours and features, and information about these is a precondition for 
different understandings of the acts observed and the practical responses to them. On 
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the other hand, in order to design effective strategies of abolition and to project 
workable alternatives, Hulsman (1991: 35) intimates that ‘we need to agree on what 
we are opposing’.  What we face now, in most societies, is a state-run organisation 
possessing the monopoly to define criminal behaviour, to prosecute that behaviour 
and to keep chosen individuals in confinement. This organisation, which is intended 
to protect society from those individuals, in reality, fails to accomplish what it 
promises.  
  There are several procedures that can be used in dealing with trouble. Dumping is 
one of then, when the issue that gives rise to a disagreement is simply ignored and the 
relationship with the disagreeing person continues. Exit is another, an option that 
consists of withdrawing from the unpleasant situation and terminating the relationship 
with the other party. Then there may be negotiation, when the two parties attempt to 
settle the matter by identifying the rules that should govern their relationship. 
Mediation is yet another option, which involves the participation of a third party 
asked to help find an agreement. With arbitration, instead, the parties appoint a third 
actor and agree in advance to accept her judgement. With adjudication, finally, a third 
authority intervenes whether or not the two parties require so (Nader and Todd, 1978; 
Hulsman, 1986). 
   Among these procedures abolitionists opt for those in which participants in conflicts 
are not constrained by the requirements of organisations or professionals. Flexibility, 
in this respect, is desirable, as it allows common meanings to emerge while giving the 
parties a possibility to learn about each other. Hulsman argues that flexibility is 
exactly what is lacking in conventional criminal justice, because situations are dealt 
with in highly formalised contexts, where definitions of issues and responses to them 
are limited, and it is unlikely that they correspond to those the parties involved would 
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elaborate. In brief, in his view, ‘trouble’ is to be turned into a participatory dispute by 
those experiencing it. 
   Crime itself is a participatory dispute, and in abolitionist thought has to be defined 
in terms of tort. According to Bianchi (1986: 116), abolitionist purposes do not 
require that an entirely new system of rules be devised. ‘We already have one, waiting 
to be applied and adapted’.  Lawyers and jurists, in this sense, are natural allies of the 
abolitionists, since they are capable, and hopefully willing, ‘to develop new concepts 
of tort which would be suitable for the regulation of crime conflicts, and rules for the 
settlement of disputes arising from what we used to call crime’. Bianchi appeals to 
psychologists, psychiatrists and social workers, calling for their skills to be adapted 
and rewritten in ways fit for conflict-regulation. ‘The new system would no longer be 
called criminal law but reparative law’, and would engage offenders in discussions 
around the harm caused and how it can be repaired (ibid). Offenders would be 
debtors: ‘Guilt and culpability should be replaced by debt, liability and responsibility’ 
(Bianchi, 1994: xi).  
       It is among the contentions of abolitionists that an entirely different system of 
crime control, including restorative forms of justice, necessitates entirely new 
linguistic terms, in order to prevent conventional reasoning from creeping in. To make 
a new system of conflict resolution stand out against the conventional punitive 
system, Bianchi introduces one such term, eunomic. This adjective is opposed to 
anomic and alienating which denote the nature of the official criminal justice system, 
and which frustrate the main participants in a conflict; the new system would be 
mainly composed of a set of  integrative rules offering opportunities to all participants 
(Bianchi, 1994). This argument takes inspiration from Roman Law, whose eunomic 
nature is epitomised by the central role played in it by restitution. The very Latin word  
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poena (from which both pain and punishment derive) refers less to the type or 
intensity of the punishment to be inflicted than to the obligation to compensate the 
victim. Before its modern translation into physical pain, poena alludes to the penalty 
to be paid directly to the injured party, rather than to the vengeful sufferance inflicted 
by the state. Even the original meaning of the Latin verb punire is ‘see to it that the 
duty of poena be fulfilled’, for an offender could usually buy off revengeful 
punishment by settling the compensation.   
 
Knowledge, Proximity and Dialogue 
 
If the official criminal justice system lacks libido sciendi, a passion for knowledge, 
the alternatives to punishment devised by abolitionism are designed with the purpose 
of producing that knowledge and collate information about actors involved in 
conflicts. Consequently, the forms of restorative justice criticised by abolitionism are 
those which, physically and metaphorically, are distant from the settings where 
conflicts take place. Professionalism attracts particularly vehement criticism.   
   The enormous expansion in the number of professionals trained for dealing with 
other people’s behavioural problems has created a range of functionaries, ‘most of 
them working in bureaucracies, from nine to four, with short encounters with clients’. 
Such professionals will not experience the consequences of their decisions; after work 
‘they will drive home to the suburbs, to partners and children and dogs’ (Christie, 
1982: 67-68). Their power consists of their alleged capacity to respond to conflicts, 
reduce their effects and prevent future conflicts from erupting. In order to control that 
power, Christie argues, those wielding it are to be made vulnerable, a task that can be 
achieved if they are denied the specificity of their qualifications and the peculiarity of 
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their status, and ultimately if they are required to live emotionally and physically in 
proximity to the situations with which they deal. Professionals who do not share the 
settings of conflicts seem to be convinced that all conflicts are to be solved or 
managed. Abolitionism talks about conflict-handling, or ‘conflict participation’, 
regarded as more promising, in concrete social interactions, than solutions.  
 
‘Conflicts are not necessarily a bad thing. They can also be seen as something 
of value, a commodity not to be wasted. Conflicts are not in abundance in a 
modern society: they are a scarcity. They are in danger of being lost, or often 
stolen. The victim in a criminal case is a sort of double loser: first vis-à-vis the 
offender, secondly vis-à-vis the state. He is excluded from any participation in 
his own conflict.’ (ibid: 93). 
 
   This appreciation of conflict reminds one of Simmel’s (1950) argument that 
attraction and repulsion are the core elements of socialisation, and that degrees of both 
contribute to processes of unification. Abolitionism translates this argument into a 
description of crime as a communicative act, expressive conduct, ‘a clumsy attempt to 
say something’. Hence the suggestion that crime should ‘become a starting point for a 
real dialogue, and not for an equally clumsy answer in the form of a spoonful of pain’ 
(Christie, 1982: 11). Existing systems, with their professional division of roles, 
hamper dialogue, allowing for many acts to be perceived as crime. Alternative 
systems, therefore, should be arranged so that the same acts are more easily seen as 
expressions of conflicting interests. ‘To reduce man-inflicted pain, one should 
encourage the construction of the latter type of systems’ (ibid).  
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   Dialogue encouraged by proximity is a key strategy suggested by abolitionists with 
a view to producing knowledge about problematic situations. In this respect, it is 
worthwhile to follow Christie’s argument in a clarifying example. Let us imagine a 
computer deciding on guilt and delivering sentences. If correctly programmed, the 
computer will reach infallible decisions. ‘After guilt was decided, nobody would need 
to attend before the judge to listen to his decisions if they themselves had some mini-
computers at their disposal. This means that chance is taken away from court-
decisions’ (Christie, 1982: 54). There is, however, another possibility, namely the re-
programming of the computer, a circumstance which would show how imperfect the 
decision-making technology may be. What are the variables that would be given 
priority weight? And most importantly, who would decide exactly what input is to be 
inserted into the system? The following are some possibilities: 
 
‘The UN in the General Assembly; the UN in the Crime Committee; regional 
bodies such as the European Council or the Union of the Arab States; national 
parliaments; regional authorities; a random sample of the population 
questioned through the telephone or personal interviews; a sample from the 
municipality of the victim or the offender; a totality of those close to the 
victim or the offender; or decisions could be made by the victim and the 
offender in cooperation’ (Christie, 1982: 55-56) 
 
Proceeding from top to bottom, the various actors listed above, all hypothetically able 
to provide input to our sentencing computer, possess increasing familiarity and 
proximity with the parties involved in the conflict. With the last option, however, we 
are faced with the maximum degree of proximity, and it is with this option that our 
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computer would become totally redundant, as the parties concerned could talk directly 
to each other.  
   Knowledge acquired by professionals differs from that informing interactions in 
lived experience, in the subterranean pattern of information shared within 
communities. It is plausible to assume that the quantity and nature of information held 
by members of a group will make sweeping concepts such as ‘crime’ needless to that 
group. This will be determined less by the size of the group than by the intensity of 
the common history the group shares. Small societies with little shared history and 
limited mutual knowledge and information about members will express demands for 
behaviour uniformity. For example, ‘dormitory towns’ will tend to turn the lack of 
interactions among its inhabitants and the absence of a common history among them 
into simplistic definitions of the others and their actions. It is against such 
aggregations of strangers that powerful, distant, institutions deliver pain. ‘Intentional 
infliction of pain is easier the further away the recipient is from the delivery-man’ 
(ibid: 83). 
    
Victims 
 
It has been suggested that restorative justice, by encouraging encounters between 
parties involved in conflict, benefits the victim’s mental health by reducing post-
traumatic stress symptoms (Strang, 2002; Braithwaite, 2007). Abolitionism holds a 
different view on the subject matter: victims can be victimised by conventional 
victimology itself. In other words, they can become the victims of the stereotypes 
imposed upon them. These stereotypes relate to their alleged incapacity to defend 
themselves, but also to their inability to define themselves as victims, the condition of 
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victim being granted by others despite them. Subsequently, those victimised by 
conventional victimology are regarded and treated as objects of tutelage, as ‘judicial 
goods’ who are required not to interfere with the situation in which they act. They are 
requested to entrust their inviolability to external agencies which are normally 
structured to reproduce principles of dependency and delegation, rather than 
principles of autonomy. While conventional victimology and conventional restorative 
justice, therefore, may use victims’ participation as a tool for the strengthening of the 
penal system, resulting in ‘increased fear of crime, daily demands for stiffer 
sentences, and a steep increase in levels of criminological nonsense’ (Carlen, 1996: 
53), abolitionism combines victims’ participation with non-penal measures, 
informality, negotiation and community involvement. 
   Compensation as devised by abolitionists, for example, is not based on abstract 
variables such as judicial truth, guilt or dangerousness, but on the responsibilities of 
the offenders, the victims, the community as a whole, and on their respective needs. In 
this exercise of justice there are no winning or losing contestants, as all are involved 
in a healing process aimed at satisfying the basic requirement for collective wellbeing 
and safety. The solution proposed by Christie (1982: 84-85) is that ‘those given the 
task of handling the conflict are not given power’, but play a mediatory role, like ‘the 
dwarf at the royal court’ who was so powerless and ‘small that he was unusually well 
suited as a go-between’; or as a child who can at times take on a similar role in a 
family conflict. In brief, such figures should act as independent third parties and 
would be ‘asked to help, but not given authority to enforce, and with no possibility of 
personal gain related to the outcome of the conflict’ (ibid). Restorative justice in the 
abolitionist perspective is not aimed at ‘restoring’ the situation preceding the conflict, 
but at clarifying values during the course of its exercise: ‘The clarification of values is 
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accomplished in the process itself. Attention is moved away from the end-result to the 
process’ (ibid: 94).  
   We must concede that abolitionism occupies a highly original position within the 
influential victims’ movement which developed since the 1970s. While victims of 
crime have long lamented the failure of the criminal justice system to keep them 
informed, and campaigns have targeted the arbitrary distinction between deserving 
and undeserving victims, institutional responses have been confined to the provision 
of governmentally centralised compensation schemes. In this way, victims become 
increasingly characterised as users, clients or consumers; and in some circumstances 
they are even given the privilege to attend the execution of those who victimised them 
(Rock, 2004; Williams, 2005). Abolitionists reject such consumerist logic, regarding 
it as an aspect of ‘industrialised justice’ in which distant authorities keep playing a 
key role in responding to problems. The participatory model they advocate puts 
institutional agencies out of the limelight, in their reparatory as well as their 
adjudicative functions. On the other hand, the victims’ movement has also been 
concerned with forms of conflict resolution that, initially tailored for the needs of the 
victims, in practice have turned out to be mainly designed for the welfare of 
offenders. In this way, the discovery of the victims, in reality, is alleged to have 
provided a good pretext for reformers to espouse increasingly lenient treatment for 
victimisers. A ‘good deal for offenders’ is therefore assumed to be the outcome of 
victim-focused justice, ‘a back door to the introduction of more humane treatment of 
offenders in a predominantly retributive system’ (Williams, 2005:  60). This 
controversial point leads us to another aspect of the debate around restorative justice, 
namely the extent to which this model of justice is victim-led or offender-led. It is the 
task of abolitionists to supersede this distinction.  
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Making Amends 
 
One of the controversies surrounding restorative justice centres on the reluctance of 
victims to participate in schemes which they suspect are geared to the interests of 
other parties rather than their own. Once they realise that an offender-approach is 
predominant, they comfortably return to the view that the only agency able to deal 
with offenders is the police force. Abolitionists outflank this controversy by 
embracing a different informal justice philosophy and practice. For Hulsman (1982), 
for example, the offender-victim dichotomy should be superseded by a view of crime 
as ‘natural disaster’, namely an event that requires solidarity mobilisation for those 
affected and efforts to prevent similar events from reoccurring. Natural disasters, 
though in a smaller scale, are likened to ‘trouble’, defined as situations in which 
people do not share a sense of how life is and should be structured, and where the lack 
of common perceptions results in conflict over ways of thinking, feeling and acting 
(Pfohl, 1981). In order to minimise conflicts, individuals may attempt to prevent 
trouble, through ‘rituals of primary ordering’, thus thwarting events which deviate 
from the order they see governing their lives. Or they can enact ‘rituals of reordering’, 
when they manage to cope with trouble and come to terms with the fact that conflicts 
are part of life (Hulsman, 1986). 
   The controversy about offender-led or victim-led restorative justice is also 
examined against the background of other considerations. For example, it is stressed 
that some ‘alternative’ justice practices extend rather than reduce the prevailing 
justice system. In an overview offered by Shonholtz (1986) an echo is found of 
abolitionist critique of professionalism: agency-mediation implies specific 
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institutional actors such as prosecutors or the police applying specific mediation 
programmes and procedures. This model is built around the power and interests of 
institutional agencies: case referrals are generally coerced, while disputant 
participation is often involuntary. In other words, the parties would not attend the 
mediation session without the agency’s pressure. ‘Since most, if not all, of these 
referrals represent matters that the justice agency would not pursue formally, the 
agency-mediation programme presents the classic “widening the net” phenomenon so 
often criticised by criminologists’ (ibid: 229). In brief, agency-mediation programmes 
are promoted not because they handle criminal referrals, but precisely because those 
referrals are not seen as legitimate criminal cases. Such programmes represent a direct 
extension of the justice system into the non-criminal, or civil, arenas, and stem from 
the recognition that traditional sources of social control (the family, the church, the 
neighbourhood) are declining: the state enters non-state areas.  
 
‘There is no attempt by the state to improve the ability or capacity of 
communities to manage their own conflicts through non-state mechanisms…. 
Thus the intention of agency-mediation programmes is to provide another 
layer of state-sponsored social control beyond the direct application of 
traditional justice theory or practice’ (ibid: 230). 
 
  On the contrary, mediation promoted by community boards, as advocated by 
abolitionists, follows a voluntary referral model and is characterised by a community-
centred rationale. The model urges the commitment of social resources and the revival 
of collective responsibility. It aims less at the suppression of conflict than at its early 
expression and potential resolution. It links the justice process to community forums 
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led by the residents’ need to organise local conflict-resolution mechanisms. It sees the 
development and maintenance of community justice forums as a democratic right and 
responsibility of citizens. Moreover, this model relies on residents trained in value-
building, communication, and conciliation skills; panel sessions are open so that all 
are given the opportunity to develop such skills.  
    Although institutional (or agency) mediation may help dilute the crime control 
system and act as a stimulant to local neighbourhoods, in the abolitionist perspective 
it may also lead to unwanted developments. For example, it may paradoxically 
revitalise the penal system, turning into ‘swift punishment without formalities’. It may 
increase control through the incorporation of a treatment ideology: punishment ends 
up becoming acceptable when disguised behind the notion of treatment (Christie, 
1996). Or simply, it may weaken social competence, transferring problems to official 
actors. Individuals are de-skilled and made dependent upon external, state-funded or 
state-licensed entities.  
   This brings to light another moot point within the restorative justice debate. Most 
programmes controlled by the state are regarded as suitable for co-option into the 
criminal justice status quo, with the community concerned taking on a subservient 
role. State intervention exacerbates the role of institutions as dumping ground for 
‘people suffering from a wide range of human miseries’, it transfers to professionals 
the community ownership of miseries and problems (McKnight, 1995). In this way, 
‘the criminal justice system compensates for the failings of economic, political, or 
social systems, which consequently deters the reform of these systems by removing 
people from open society who are its products’ (Elliott, 2009: 156). The community, 
thus, becomes an amorphous ideal, an acquiescent aggregation of citizens perfectly 
aligned with state agencies (Pavlich, 2005).  Restorative justice focused on 
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community development, instead, ‘is less concerned with meeting the needs of 
institutions than it is with meeting the needs of the people involved in, and affected 
by, conflicts’ (Elliott, 2009: 164). Conflicts, therefore, should be seen as opportunities 
for establishing dialogue and seeking solutions, in a process leading to wider 
relationships and wider mutual knowledge. By placing the conflict within the skills 
and competency of trained community people, many of whom former disputants, 
mediation enacted by community forums or boards is able to place responsibility for 
the expression and resolution of the conflict on the disputants.  
 
‘Moreover, the forum is the community’s statement of its capacity and 
confidence to accept responsibility for handling conflicts at the neighbourhood 
level. The voluntary resolution of conflict between disputants is advanced as a 
positive value… Voluntary resolutions are, first and foremost, a positive 
statement between the disputants about themselves, each other, and the 
situation’ (Shonholtz, 1986: 233-4). 
 
Shaming and Peace 
 
When abolitionists support voluntary resolution of conflict, they implicitly distance 
themselves from to the logic of reintegrative shaming, an ambivalent notion that 
raises enthusiasm and criticism in equal measure. According to Braithwaite (1989), 
shaming is more effective than conventional punishment in that it is not administered 
by a specific agency or institution, but involves the participation of a whole 
community. For the conscience-building effects of shaming to be produced, in fact, 
community-wide mobilisation is necessary. Children may learn about the evil of 
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murder and theft in an abstract manner, ‘but the shaming of the local offender known 
personally to children in the neighbourhood is especially important, because the 
wrongdoing and the shaming are so vivid as to have a lasting impression’ (ibid: 77). 
Regarded as akin to Etzioni’s (2001) communitarianism, this position has been the 
target of criticism for its implying a ‘monochrome society’ in which people identify 
one another with what they have in common rather than with what divides them. In 
such a society the loss of shared social and legal boundaries amounts to the decline of 
the policing force expressed by shame (Massaro, 1997). The revival of shaming 
punishment ‘as a way of expressing and reinforcing shared moral values’ is therefore 
recommended (Nussbaum, 2004: 175). Like the branding of the criminals in previous 
epochs, the shaming of offenders might take the form of a sign worn on their 
property, clothes or face. ‘I am a thief’ printed on a teenager’s T-shirt could be one 
example of shaming, although its integrative function remains to be proven.  
   There are, however, different ways of applying the concept of communitarianism to 
criminal justice issues. In a theory of social order expressed by Cordella (1996), for 
example, conformity is determined by three distinct ‘unity patterns’ related to as 
many types of operational moralities. An ‘atomistic unity pattern’ guides 
individualism and opportunistic calculus, whereby those who conform do so for fear 
of retaliation. An ‘organic unity pattern’, which echoes Durkheimian categories, is 
enacted when individuals develop feelings of reciprocity due to the role and social 
rewards they enjoy in relation to similarly satisfied individuals. Finally, a ‘personal 
unity pattern’, which results from disinterested care for others and is engendered ‘by a 
common life and personal morality that is conciliatory with social harmony the 
primary goals’ (Richards, 2009: 115). While one may concur that the prevailing 
pattern in contemporary societies is the ‘atomistic unity pattern’, disagreement arises 
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as to the tools which may favour a shift from this to the other patterns. Can 
institutional shaming contribute to such shift, or is communitarian shaming better 
equipped for the task? 
   The evangelical enthusiasm with which shaming in general has been received 
prompts a qualifying distinction. We have reintegrative shaming and disintegrative 
shaming or stigmatisation. The former expresses collective disapproval, which may 
range from ‘mild rebuke to degradation ceremonies’ followed by ‘gestures of 
reacceptance into the community of law-abiding citizens’. The deviant is thus 
decertified or de-labelled. In contrast, disintegrative shaming divides the community 
by creating a class of outcasts, whose only source of respect will be other similarly 
‘shamed’ individuals and groups.   
 
‘Much effort is directed at labelling deviance, while little attention is paid to 
de-labelling, to signifying forgiveness and reintegration, to ensuring that the 
deviance label is applied to the behaviour rather than the person, and that this 
is done under the assumption that the disapproved behaviour is transient, 
performed by an essentially good person’ (Braithwaite, 1989: 55). 
 
   There is no space for either integrative or disintegrative shaming in abolitionist 
analysis. Integration, rather, is achieved through communal means with the 
involvement of actors who are devoid of the power to shame and do not supinely lend 
themselves to be shamed. For example, in his support of community boards, Hulsman 
(1982) stresses the importance of the training of local residents in conflict resolution. 
Local mediators, in his view, should listen to the parties separately, and prepare a 
resolution of compromise on the basis of what they have heard. This is then submitted 
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to those concerned in the conflict and amended until it is eventually accepted by all. 
Mediators, or conciliators, according to this model, are not required to resolve 
conflicts, rather, they are trained to help people acknowledge by themselves the nature 
of their conflicts, learn to listen to and understand one another. Community boards 
have also a hidden merit: because any given person should not be allowed to sit on 
one such board for longer than two years, slowly the situation will be reached where 
most local residents have been mediators or conciliators. With time, the whole 
community will become more ‘conciliatory’.    
 
Conclusion 
 
It is hard to establish to what extent abolitionist ideas have contributed to the 
increasing interest in non-penal measures. The timid and desultory processes of 
decarceration and decriminalisation that we have witnessed over the last decades may 
include abolitionist elements, particularly when accompanied by non institutional 
mediation, direct discussion between parties, and restitution or reparation of the 
damage caused. This, according to Christie (1986b: 104), may have reduced the state 
monopoly in inflicting pain, helped circulate ‘a set of ideas intended to reduce 
suffering, and increased positive responses and basic trust in ordinary human beings’. 
However, abolitionists share the view, recorded above, that non penal measures run 
the risk of being co-opted back by institutional actors; for example, mediation boards 
may become bureaucratised and ‘board-administrators might be temped to take on 
cases of shoplifting: they are mostly easy to handle and look good in the statistics’. 
Even compensation may turn into life-long debt for some offenders, while board 
members themselves may quite conventionally ‘share the common indignation when 
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children and young people misbehave’. Moreover, some offenders may find 
compensation more daunting than a traditional suspended sentence. Finally, boards 
may be ‘under the Ministry of Justice, a ministry accustomed to thinking in categories 
of utility and efficiency’ (Christie, 1996:198).  
   In this paper the view of abolitionists on restorative justice has been presented, and 
their emphasis on community, rather than agency, conflict resolution has been 
discussed. Some forms of restorative justice, in the abolitionist critique, may 
discourage voluntary or lay members from joining mediation or reparation boards, 
because they may be viewed as mere ministerial emanations aimed at turning the 
initial community-led motivation of members into a profession.  
   Returning to Durkheim’s concerns highlighted at the beginning, abolitionists seem 
aware that non-penal measures based on reparation and compensation may instil 
respect for the rules of the market rather than for other human beings. This, however, 
happens when abolitionist elements become institutionalised in official professional 
set ups. In such cases, members of mediation boards are converted into civil servants.  
   The danger of institutionalisation, therefore, may be averted if the principles of 
‘industrialised justice’ (as Christie calls it) are rejected, and a peaceful reactivation of 
community dynamics is pursued through participation. This would imply a fourfold 
solidarity: ‘for the people being sentenced, for their victims, for the community as a 
whole, and for those who guarantee the functioning of the penal system, who would 
feel happily liberated if they could stop working for the survival of such a machinery’ 
(Hulsman, 1986: 123). Durkheim’s observation that restitution ‘is not true solidarity’, 
because it restores relationships between individuals and things rather than between 
individuals, certainly applies to the model of ‘industrialised justice’, where organic 
solidarity is based on abstract division of labour, distance between roles and 
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anonymity of crowds. Professionalism exacerbates all of this, hampering the 
development of mutual dependence among individuals, whose experience of conflict 
is translated into agency routine. Response to crime, all too often, remains the remit of 
‘experts in conflict’ rather than the arena for discussion among those experiencing it. 
Experts, inevitably, feel that they have to bring salvation and that their profession 
consists of a ‘fight’; consequently they may be led to acquire skills suitable for 
‘humanitarian wars’. By contrast,  
 
We should turn to experts on how to create peace. For criminologists in 
particular, peace researchers are probably some of the most valuable potential 
models, providing categories, methods, insights and organisational principles 
of great relevance’ (Christie, 1986c: 53). 
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